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Case No. 20140402-CA 
INTI-IE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHERMAN ALEXANDER LYNCH, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
V. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner Shern1an Alexander Lynch appeals the dismissal and 
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Annotated§ 78A-4-103(2)(f) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 3, 2007, Sherman Lynch's wife, Patricia Rothermich, was 
taking an afternoon walk when a vehicle struck her from behind and killed 
her. After Lynch was interviewed on television about Rothermich's death, 
his secret girlfriend contacted police and told them that she had helped 
1 The caption and title page of Lynch's brief incorrectly list the State 
as "Plaintiff/ Appellee" and Lynch as the "Defendant/ Appellant." As 
explained below, however, this is not an appeal frmn the criminal case. 
Rather, this is Lynch's appeal frmn the dis1nissal of his post-conviction case, 
wherein he is the Petitioner and the State is the Respondent. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65C(i). 
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Lynch buy a used truck a few weeks earlier. With her help, officers found 
Lynch's truck hidden in an abandoned garage near his home. 
Lynch's truck had recent damage to its hood and windshield that was 
consistent with having been in a collision. Two different kinds of paint 
from the truck's surface matched paint that had h·ansferred to the back of 
Rothermich' s clothing when she was struck from behind. The fracture 
pattern on a zip tie fragment that was found inside the truck's engine 
matched the fracture pattern on a broken zip tie that was found in the 
roadway where Rothermich was hit. Then, when police questioned Lynch, 
he first denied owning a truck, and he then repeatedly changed his story as 
police showed that each version of his changing story was false. 
A jury later convicted Lynch of murder, and Lynch's conviction was 
upheld on direct appeal. Lynch then filed a post-conviction petition, but, 
after several hearings, the district court dismissed or denied them all. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The post-conviction court ruled that Lynch was procedurally 
barred from re-litigating claims in post-conviction that he had already 
litigated in the criminal case. \!Vas this ruling erroneous? 
2. The post-conviction court then granted the State's request for 
summary judgment on the remaining claims, concluding that Lynch's 
-2-
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proffered evidence failed as a matter of law to prove that he received 
ineffective assistance. Was this ruling erroneous? 
Standard of Review: Review is for correctness. See Honie v. State, 2014 
UT 19, if 28,342 P.3d 182. 
3. In post-conviction, Lynch claimed that he had new evidence 
showing that police had planted evidence at the crime scene and that his 
truck was not involved in the murder. After weighing the evidence, the 
post-conviction court denied the claim. Was this conclusion erroneous? 
Standard of Review: The district court's legal conclusions are reviewed 
for correctness and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Kell v. 
State, 2012 UT 25, ~8, 285 P.3d 1133; Brown v. State, 2013 UT 42, ,J37, 308 
P.3d 486. "Due to the fact-dependent nature of this issue," however, this 
Court should" afford the h·ial court a measure of deference in its application 
of the law to the facts of this case." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ,J19, 40 P.3d 
611. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are in Addendum A: Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-106 
('!\Test 2009) (post-conviction procedural bars); Utah Code Annotated § 78B-
9-104 (West 2009) (post-conviction newly discovered evidence standard). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE2 
The murder and the trial 
On October 3, 2007, Patricia Rothermich was struck from behind 
while on an afternoon walk. R283:53-68. She was found laying in the 
bushes a few minutes later by passers-by, and she died en route to the 
hospital. R283:33, 40, 61, 68. 
Detective Michael Anderson directed the initial investigation. 
R283:71-72. Anderson had advanced training in accident reconstruction and 
worked with the county's major accident team. R283:69-70. Based on the 
height of Rothermich's injuries and her slide pattern, Anderson suspected 
that she had been struck by a" truck or a van." R283:97. 
Anderson observed what appeared to be white paint that had 
transferred to the back of Rothermich' s pants when she was hit. R283:93. 
Anderson also found three broken zip ties in the roadway. R283:81, 85. The 
zip ties had fallen "in line with the collision path," suggesting that they had 
"come off of a vehicle that was involved in this collision." R283:82-83. One 
of the zip ties had "what appeared to be white paint in the locking" part of 
2 The State cites the record fr01n the criminal case as R_ and the 
record fr01n the post-conviction case as PCR_. 
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the tie. Id. Anderson took photographs of the zip ties in the roadway. 
PCR2096:75-78. 3 
Sherman Lynch was Rothermich's husband. At the hospital that 
afternoon, he appeared so overcome by grief that he experienced muscle 
loss in his legs and needed to be pushed around in a wheelchair. R284:63, 
93. Lynch kept saying "What am I going to do?" R284:67. But while 
hugging a friend at the hospital, Lynch "started to say, 'What have I ... '", 
only to then "im1nediately correct[]" himself and repeat, "'What an1 I going 
to do."' Id. 
While eating dinner with friends that night, Lynch opened a fortune 
cookie that said that he would be "coming into smne money." R284:76, 98. 
Lynch "found that quite amusing." R284:98. He told others at the table 
"something about her retirement" and "maybe something about insurance." 
R284:76. 
Over the next few days, Lynch appeared on television and made 
emotional pleas for help in finding the driver who sh·uck Rothennich. 
R284:126-27. One of the people who saw his pleas was Nancy Scott, Lynch's 
3 Some of these photographs were adn1itted at trial and later at the 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing in this case. R283:84; PCR2096:75-78; 
see also State's Exh.'s 3 to 7 (post-conviction evidentiary hearing) (attached 
as Addendum B). 
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girlfriend at the time who did not know that he was 1narried. R284:124-25. 
Lynch's apparent emotion in his television interviews was disconcerting to 
Scott because Lynch had called her on the night Lynch's wife died and-
without any emotion-cancelled a scheduled dinner date. Id. 
Scott contacted police and told them that she had recently helped 
Lynch buy a used white truck from a local auction house. R284:129-30. 
Scott then took officers to a garage near Lynch's house where Lynch had 
kept the truck. R283:112, 114; 284:133, 137. The truck was not there, but 
officers found scraps of carpet on the ground with white spray paint on 
them, as well as metal shavings. R283:115, 137-38; 284:218-19. 
Allan Ostler, the owner of that garage, later submitted an affidavit 
that was introduced at trial attesting that Lynch had kept a white truck in 
his garage during the month of September 2007, that Lynch had painted 
some rust spots on the truck with white spray paint, and that the hood on 
Lynch's h·uck did not close properly. R284:213-14. Ostler also attested that 
he saw Lynch driving the truck one day and that, while the truck was in 
m.otion, the hood blew open. R284:213-14. Ostler then attested that he had 
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Officers also learned that at the end of September, a truck was briefly 
parked outside an abandoned garage a few streets away, covered with a 
tarp and secured with stakes. R284:155, 165-66. Officers then learned that, a 
few days later, the boards covering that garage were unsecured and the 
truck was no longer seen outside. R283:147. Officers subsequently searched 
that garage and found a white truck inside. R283:116. The truck's VIN 
number matched the VIN number from the truck Lynch had bought with 
Nancy Scott's assistance in August. R283:130. Officers also found an 
auction sticker with Lynch's name on it. R285:71. 
When Detective Anderson examined this h·uck, he found "exactly the 
kind of damage" he had "expect[ ed] to see" from the collision that killed 
Rothermich. R283:125. Anderson found that the truck's hood did not close 
properly. R283:137. Anderson also saw holes that had been drilled into the 
metal on the truck's front frame. R283:137-38. Pictures of those holes were 
later admitted at trial. Id. 
Anderson saw a tow hook on the front of the truck that he thought 
"may" have caused one of Rothermich' s leg injuries. R283:131, 136. 
Anderson also saw a splash guard or spoiler that he thought may have 
caused those injuries as well. R283:136. Officers later tested the spoiler and 
found DNA from an unidentifiable female on it. R285:22. 
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Officers also found a zip tie fragment lodged inside the engine block. 
R283:139-40. The zip tie fragment had "random fracture lines" that 
"match[ed] up perfectly" with the fracture lines in one of the zip ties that 
was found in the roadway where Rothermich was killed. R285:35. 
Officers contacted Joseph Taylor, who had owned the truck before 
selling it to the auction house. Taylor said that the truck's hood did not 
latch properly and that he had never used zip ties to secure it. R285:76-77. 
When Taylor examined the truck now, he noticed several changes to it since 
he had sold it-namely, rust spots had been covered with white paint; an 
antenna was missing; the windshield was now cracked; and there was new 
damage to the front of the hood. Id. Taylor also noticed "two holes in the 
sheet metal under the hood along the front of the engine compartment." 
R285:77. 
Lynch was interviewed a few days after police found his truck. 
Lynch initially denied owning any vehicles other than his van, recently 
purchasing any vehicles, or keeping any vehicles in Ostler' s garage. State's 
Trial Exh. 94 at 15:02-15:06, 20:50-21:00, 31:36-31:48.4 But when the officer 
then specifically asked Lynch if had owned a truck, Lynch acknowledged 
that, "awhile back," he had bought a "cheap pickup" for his teenage son, 
4 State's Trial Exhibit 94 was a video of this interview. 
-8-
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explaining "that if you hit something with a truck you won't get hurt." Id. 
at 31:55, 35:00-38:52. When the officer asked where that truck was now, 
Lynch said that it had broken down on the freeway several weeks earlier 
and that he had given it to a man named "Chuck" who stopped to help. Id. 
at 35:50-37:40. Lynch said that he did not have any contact information for 
"Chuck." Id. at 41:21. When the officer then informed Lynch that police 
now had his truck in their possession, Lynch asked for a lawyer. Id. at 
51:40.5 
When officers searched Lynch's house, they found khaki pants in his 
hamper with white paint on them. R284:53-54, 229. They found a tarp and 
stakes matching those that were seen covering a truck by the abandoned 
garage, as well as five white spray paint cans. R285:59, 62, 65, 131, 135. 
Officers also found the title and registration for the white truck hidden in a 
hollow space behind the license plate of Lynch's van. R285:53, 56. 
A forensic analyst later testified that paint "fragments" that were 
found on Rothermich' s clothing after she was struck could have cmne from 
3 An officer later calculated the combined distance from (1) the 
auction house, to (2) Lynch's home, to (3) the place on the freeway where 
Lynch said the truck broke down and he gave it to "Chuck," and then to (4) 
the abandoned garage where it was found. That combined 1nileage would 
have been greater than the number of miles that had actually been added to 
the h·uck's odometer between the time that its previous owner traded it in 
and its discovery by police in the abandoned garage. See R285:77, 109-110. 
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the "same source" as the factory paint from Lynch's truck- i.e., that they 
came fr01n the "same distinct type of paint as that on the hood of the truck" 
and matched it on multiple microscopic layers. R284:181, 200, 202. The 
analyst also testified that paint smears on the back of Rothermich's pants 
came from the "same distinct type" of spray paint that was used on Lynch's 
truck. R284:199. 
Lynch was charged with murder. Rl-2. He was represented by 
Monte Sleight and Julie George at trial, and Judge Deno Himonas presided 
over that trial. R132, 137, 168, 173-74. The jury convicted Lynch of murder. 
R173-74, 196. 
Lynch unsuccessfully moves for a new trial 
Sleight and George then withdrew, and Lynch filed motion for a new 
trial with the assistance of a new appointed attorney. R224-28. In that 
motion, Lynch claimed that (1) his trial counsel were ineffective, and (2) he 
had newly discovered evidence that proved his innocence. R224. 
Ineffective assistance claim: In the ineffective assistance claiin, Lynch 
asserted that his trial counsel did not present evidence that he had showing 
that his h·uck was not the one that sh·uck his wife. Id. To support this 
claim, Lynch included "a scale diagram showing the locations of the 
injuries, the paint analysis done on the pants, and the various damage and 
-10-
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oxidation marks on his truck," which he claimed "his trial attorneys refused 
to submit and/ or argue to the jury." Id. Lynch also had a mechanic 
examine the truck to measure the distance of "the tow hook" to the 
"truck[']s midline." R225 n.4, 253-54; see also R242, 267 n.6 (confirming that 
this inspection was done). Lynch then made specific arguments about the 
height of the tow hook and other truck components as compared to 
Rothermich' s injuries. R253-54. 
Lynch also faulted his counsel for not "follow[ing] obvious 
investigative leads in his case," such as not consulting or hiring a DNA 
expert. PCR1623. In a subsequent handwritten letter to the court to 
supplement his new trial motion, Lynch argued that trial counsel 
overlooked evidence showing that his h·uck' s grill could not have struck his 
wife. He noted that Detective Anderson testified at trial that there was 
'"some white oxidation on the grill' that was easily 'transferred onto [his] 
finger."' R255-56. Lynch then noted that the State's "paint analyst could not 
match this oxidation to anything found on my wife's clothes, which would 
have been impossible if she had been hit by the grill of my h·uck." R256. In 
addition, Lynch noted that Anderson had also "described a black paint that 
covered the grill [that] was flaking off," and similarly argued that his truck 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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could not have hit Rothermich because the "paint analyst did not find any 
of this black, flaking paint on my wife's clothes." Id. 
Newly discovered evidence claim: In his motion, Lynch also claimed 
that he had newly discovered evidence-namely that, shortly after 
Rothermich was killed, a woman named Michelle Ashe told officers that she 
had overheard a man in a store say that he had "hit a woman in Holladay 
when he beca1ne distracted by something falling on the floor of the vehicle." 
R226-27. Lynch later asked the court to h·eat this as both a newly discovered 
evidence claim and an ineffective assistance claim. R288:80. 
Evidentiary hearing: Lynch testified at an evidentiary hearing on this 
motion. He said that, after personally reviewing the discovery before trial, 
he was able to "correlate[ ]" "a lot of information" to "show[ ] that it was 
impossible for my truck to have struck my wife." R288:17. Lynch talked 
about "paint n1ismatches" and "injury 1nismatches," as well as the absence 
of any "damage to the front of the vehicle." Id. Lynch also testified about 
the absence of any oxidized paint or black fragn1ents from the grill on his 
wife's clothing. R288:44-45, 51. 
Lynch also testified about the alleged mismatch between the height of 
the injuries and the height of the various components on his truck. R288:46-
47. Lynch faulted his counsel for not measuring the tow hook's height, and 
-12-
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then stated his belief that the tow hook was "maybe a foot, at least a foot, 
more likely a foot and a half possibly from the mid-line of the truck." 
R288:47. Lynch also faulted his counsel for not "bother[ing] to consider" 
and "address" alleged problems with the State's paint evidence at trial. 
R288:41-42. 
Finally, Lynch testified that he was aware before trial of "five or six" 
tips detectives had received that other trucks were in the area and could 
have struck Rothermich. R288:24, 31. Lynch specifically asserted that trial 
counsel performed deficiently by not calling Michelle Ashe to testify about 
the conversation she allegedly overheard. R288:24-25. 
In addition to Lynch, Julie George-who had been Lynch's trial 
counsel- also testified. She testified that she had a private investigator who 
had a "background in accident reconstruction" assist her and co-counsel 
with the case. R288:68-69. She testified that she spent "many, many hours" 
going "through the discovery with regard to the accident reconstruction" 
with him. R288:69. 
George testified that Lynch initially asked her to arrange II an 
independent test" of the truck based on his belief that it was mechanically 
incapable of reaching speeds necessary to strike and kill Rothermich. 
R288:73-74; see also PCR1640. George testified that she arranged to have an 
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investigator examine the truck and test-drive it, but that when Lynch found 
out that officers would observe the test and be allowed to testify about it at 
trial, Lynch asked George to cancel the test drive and" agreed that the truck 
should not be tested by the defense." R288:74-75. 
George also explained her decision not to call a paint expert. She 
explained that she, the investigator, and Lynch "began discussing" the paint 
analysis about a month before trial and ultimately decided that a defense 
paint expert would be unhelpful, primarily because the State's expert had 
not been able to definitively link the paint on Lynch's truck to the paint 
found on Rothermich. R288:72. George explained that she and the 
investigator concluded that they could get what they needed by cross-
examining the State's expert. Id. 
George also testified about the decision not to call Michelle Ashe as a 
witness. George was aware of Ashe's report to police, but believed that (1) 
Ashe's testimony would be inadmissible hearsay, and (2) the defense could 
bring relevant information about her report out through cross-examination 
of State witnesses. R288:76. George also acknowledged that she was aware 
of other shnilar reports that were made to police, but "felt based on h·ial 
strategy that it was better" to also address those reports through cross-
examination of State's witnesses to "show the jury that there were other 
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people that could have been looked at, other possibilities for explaining the 
motor vehicle accident, and then summarize that in closing argument." Id. 
Ruling: Judge Himonas denied Lynch's new trial motion. R263-69. 
Judge Himonas first rejected Lynch's claim that "the height of the truck, the 
location of Rothermich' s injuries, and the paint transfers ( or non-transfers) 
... made it impossible for his truck to have struck his wife." R265. Judge 
Himonas also addressed and rejected the claims regarding defense counsel's 
failure to "follow up with Michelle Ashe," noting that this information was 
brought to the jury's attention through other witnesses. R267. 
Appeal 
Linda Jones represented Lynch on appeal. See State v. Lynch, 2011 UT 
App 1, 246 P.3d 525. On appeal, Lynch claimed that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because they did not request a separate jury instruction requiring 
the State to affirmatively disprove his purported alibi. See id. at ,I,I14-17. 
Lynch also argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct. See id. at 
,I,l18-20. Lynch did not, however, appeal the denial of his new h·ial 1notion. 
See geHerally id. at ~iI14-21. This Court rejected Lynch's clain1S. See id. at 
if ,J14-20. 
-15-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Post-Conviction 
Lynch then filed a post-conviction petition that raised 28 ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims and a newly discovered evidence claim. See 
PCR1021-53. 
Ineffective assistance claims: Lynch claimed that his trial counsel did 
not properly investigate or present evidence about: 
• Michelle Ashe' s report, as well as a report from a man named Brian 
Maxwell who allegedly saw a red truck in the area ( claims 2, 3, 4); 
• The truck's physical components (1, 12, 18, 21, 26); 
• Rothermich's injuries (8, 9, 11, 17, 28); 
• Zip ties (5, 6, 7, 13, 27); 
• Paint and paint analysis (14, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25); and 
• The h·uck' s grill (10, 15, 16, 23). 
PCR1024-49. Lynch also claimed that his appellate counsel was ineffective 
for omitting each of these claims on direct appeal. PCR1049-50. 
The State moved for summary judgment. PCR1527-1617. The State 
first argued that many (but not all) of Lynch's claims were barred because 
he previously raised or addressed them during the new trial proceedings. 
PCR1557-1612. The State also alternatively argued that all of the ineffective 
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assistance claims were barred because they could have been raised at trial or 
on appeal. Id. 
Judge Himonas granted summary judgment on all of Lynch's 
ineffective assistance claims. PCR1741-47 (Addendum C). 6 
Newly discovered evidence claim: Lynch also claimed that he was 
entitled to relief based on newly discovered evidence. PCR1050-51. Lynch 
supported this with affidavits from Terry Steed and Benjamin Warren, two 
private investigators who examined his truck in February 2012. See 
PCR1008, 1050-51. Judge Himonas denied the State's summary judgment 
motion on this claim and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on it. PCR1745-
46. 
At the hearing, Steed testified that he and Warren were accompanied 
by Detective Anderson when they inspected the b·uck. Steed testified that 
Anderson told them that there were no "zip-ties found at the scene" and 
that officers had "brought the zip-ties" and 11 attached them to the vehicle in 
order to h·ansport the vehicle to the evidence facility." PCR2096:18. Steed 
6 Judge I-Iimonas ruled that claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
and 23 were barred because they \\7 ere previously litigated. PCRl 743. Judge 
Himonas then dismissed both these and the remaining ineffective assistance 
claims because they could have been previously litigated and Lynch had not 
proven that his prior counsel was ineffective for not raising them. PCR1744-
45. 
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testified that when Anderson made this statement, Robbie Ipson- the 
evidence manager for Unified Police-also told them that "he agreed" that 
"[w]e brought them. We brought the zip-ties." Id. Steed further testified 
that he "could not find anything that would have been conducive to 
needing zip-ties to hold anything in place or to be otherwise used" on the 
truck. PCR2096:19. 
On cross-examination, however, Steed admitted that he "was meeting 
a lot of new faces and a lot of new people with a lot of different names" 
during the inspection and that he could not "say, in all honesty and without 
any reservation," that Anderson made the comment about the zip ties. 
PCR2096:32. He now agreed that he was "not entirely sure that Detective 
Anderson made any of those statements." PCR2096:33-34. 
Moreover, Steed agreed that there was II absolutely" a place II on the 
front of the vehicle to which a zip-tie could have been attached." 
PCR2096:22-23. Steed said that "the grill, itself, could have had 30 or 40 of 
them on there." PCR2096:23. In addition, Steed acknowledged that there 
were proble1ns with the h·uck's hood. He said that "it was not easy to make 
the hood close," and that it "didn't work as well as it should." PCR2096:21-
22. Steed admitted that he never drove the truck and had no "first-hand 
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knowledge of how the hood perfonns when it is driven at high speeds." 
PCR 2096:22. 
Benjamin Warren also testified. Like Steed, Warren claimed that 
Detective Anderson told them that zip-ties "weren't found on the scene." 
PCR2096:38. But Warren added a new detail: namely, that Anderson told 
them that the zip ties were used by officers to "attach parts of the truck from 
the scene." Id. (emphasis added). Warren repeated this specific claim on 
cross-examination, claiming that Anderson said that officers "had actually 
used those zip-ties on the truck at the scene of the accident." PCR2096:41 
( emphasis added). 7 
On cross-examination, Warren also admitted that he never drove the 
h·uck, never saw it driven, and had no "first-hand knowledge of how the 
hood would perform if the truck was driven at 30 miles an hour." 
PCR2096:39. Warren agreed that he did not "have any real basis" to know 
"how this h·uck works or what it does or doesn't need," and that it was 
"possible the zip-ties could have been attached" to the grill. PCR2096:40. 
When Detective Anderson testified, he reaffirmed that he found the 
zip ties "in the collision path" where Rothermich was struck and that he 
7 As noted above, officers did not find the truck at the scene of the 
accident. R283:116. 
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"saw something white on the zip-ties" that "appeared to be paint." 
PCR2096:47-48. He admitted that officers were "never a hundred percent 
sure of exactly where and how" the zip ties "were attached to the front of 
the vehicle." PCR2096:83. He said that one theory was that the zip ties "ran 
through the front portion of the underside of the hood and, possibly, 
attached to the grill or some kind of hard-ducking component of the 
underside of the hood, such as the front clip." Id. Another theory was that 
they "possibly could have been attaching the grill, itself, to something inside 
of the vehicle, more secure, simply just because of how loose things were on 
the front of the vehicle." Id. 
As for the alleged conversation with Steed and Warren, Anderson 
said that he "never had any conversations" with Warren. PCR2096:86. He 
acknowledged speaking with Steed, but said that Steed "never" asked about 
the "discovery of the zip-ties at the scene" and that he "never" said that 
"there were no zip-ties found at the scene." PCR2096:86-87. 
Anderson also repeatedly denied planting zip ties at the crime scene. 
PCR2096:81, 88. Anderson said that when he arrived at the collision scene, 
there were "probably, 10, 15 people" already there and that he was "never" 
alone at the scene. PCR2096:49, 74-75. Anderson also authenticated the 
photos taken at the scene that showed zip ties in the road. PCR 2096:75-78. 
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As noted, Steed had testified that the evidence manager, Robbie 
Ipson, told hiln that "[w]e brought" the zip ties to the scene. PCR2096:18. 
At the hearing, however, Ipson testified that he did not go to that crime 
scene, was not "involved in the direct collection of evidence," and didn't 
"know how the evidence was collected at the crime scene." PCR2096:103-
04. He specifically denied saying anything to Steed anything about the zip 
ties. PCR2096:103-04. 
Finally, the State called Detective Brett Stewart, who was Detective 
Anderson's partner during the Lynch investigation. PCR2096:108. Stewart 
testified that neither he nor Anderson were ever alone at the scene. 
PCR2096:109. He also testified that they did find the zip ties there and that 
the photographs of the zip ties at the scene were accurate. PCR2096:11 l. 
At the close of the hearing, Judge Hiinonas ruled from the bench. 
PCR2096:141-45 (Addendum D). He began by expressing his belief that 
Lynch was "miles and miles away" from meeting the PCRA's newly 
discovered evidence standard. PCR2096:141. 
Judge Hirnonas stated that he did not think Warren or Steed were 
"shading the truth" about "whatever they thought they heard," but 
concluded that they had "mishear[d]" things. PCR2096:143, 144. He then 
specifically found that Anderson was "credible" when he said that he never 
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told Steed or Warren that zip ties were not found at the scene. 
PCR2096:143. Judge Himonas explained that it II defies common sense" and 
11 defies logic in any way, shape or form" to maintain that Anderson would 
have 1nade those comments to Warren and Steed. PCR2096:142. Judge 
Himonas found that it is "beyond dispute" that Detective Anderson found 
and photographed the zip-ties at the crime scene on the day of the murder. 
PCR2096:141-42, 144. Judge Himonas concluded that "there's absolutely no 
evidence" that the detectives planted the zip ties as Lynch was now 
claiming, and "[f]or all of those reasons and, frankly, more," denied the 
petition °in its entirety." PCR2096:145. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I(a): The PCRA bars the re-litigation of claims that were raised 
or addressed II at trial or on appeal." Lynch, however, claims that the 
statutory phrase II at trial" does not apply to new trial motions. Lynch is 
wrong. That phrase does not refer to a particular proceeding, but instead 
refers to a stage of the criminal justice process. 
Lynch's conh·ary reading would lead to absurd results. Under that 
view, a defendant could not re-raise claims he raised during the evidence 
presentation at h·ial itself or on appeal, but he could re-raise claims that 
were already litigated in between the two or even before evidence 
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presentation at trial began. Such an interpretation would undercut the very 
purpose the PCRA's procedural bars serve-to require litigants to raise the 
claims once and at the earliest possible time. 
Point l(b): Lynch alternatively argues that his claims should not have 
been procedurally barred because he did not "raise" them with enough 
specificity during the new trial proceedings in the criminal case. Lynch is 
incorrect. During those proceedings, Lynch presented evidence and made 
arguments about each of the claims at issue. He accordingly cannot re-
litigate them in post-conviction. 
Point II: Judge Himonas also correctly ruled that Lynch had not 
proven any of his ineffective assistance claims. 
First, Lynch's proffer, read in light of the whole record, failed as a 
matter of law to prove that his trial counsel were ineffective for not 
examining the truck. There was no deficient performance, because (1) 
counsel decided not to examine the truck only after examining photographs 
of it with the assistance of a h·ained investigator, and (2) Lynch specifically 
asked them to cancel a planned inspection. Moreover, there was no 
prejudice because Lynch has not shown that an inspection would have 
uncovered additional evidence that would have made acquittal reasonably 
likely. 
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Second, Lynch's proffer failed to prove that his counsel were 
ineffective for omitting additional argmnents about whether the zip ties 
were actually used on his truck or discovered at the crime scene. At trial, 
the State produced photographs of the zip ties that were taken at the scene, 
and several witnesses testified that they found them there. On this record, 
neither appellate counsel nor trial counsel were obligated to raise what 
would have been frivolous arguments that they were not actually there or 
used on his truck. 
Third, Lynch also failed to prove that his counsel were ineffective for 
deciding not to have an independent expert analysis done on the paint 
samples. Lynch proffered no evidence about what an independent expert 
would have said, let alone shown that this would have been enough to 
undermine confidence in the outcome. 
Finally, Lynch failed to prove that his counsel were ineffective for not 
calling additional witnesses to testify about other possible suspects. At the 
new h·ial hearing, trial counsel explained that the defense considered and 
chose not to call those witnesses because counsel wanted to minimize the 
State's ability to respond to those reports. This decision was objectively 
reasonable. 
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Point III: Finally, Lynch argues that the post-conviction court erred 
when it denied the newly discovered evidence claim. But after hearing the 
testimony, Judge Himonas concluded that Lynch's evidence fell "miles and 
miles" short of satisfying the Lynch's burden. And for good reason: 
Lynch's investigators both equivocated about key aspects of their claims, 
and their underlying premise- that police planted the zip ties and then lied 
about them at trial-ran contrary to the great weight of the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Lynch was procedurally barred from raising the claims that 
he previously raised in his new trial motion. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) prohibits a petitioner 
from obtaining relief on a claim that was "raised or addressed at trial or on 
appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(b) (West 2009) ("the previous-
litigation procedural bar"). It also prohibits a petitioner from obtaining 
relief on a claim that "could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal." Id. § 78B-9-106(1)(c). If a clailn is barred under -106(1)(c), a 
petitioner may obtain relief if he demonstrates that "the failure to raise that 
ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. § 78B-9-106(3). But 
if a claim is barred under the previous-litigation procedural bar, there is no 
ineffective assistance exception. See id. § 78B-9-106(1)(b). Instead, the 
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petitioner simply "is not eligible for relief" on that ground. Id. § 78B-9-
106(1). 
In this case, Judge Himonas ruled that the claims that Lynch raised in 
the new trial 1notion in the criminal case were procedurally barred under 
previous-litigation procedural bar. PCR1743. Lynch now challenges this, 
arguing that (A) this procedural bar only applies to claims raised durmg the 
evidence presentation portion of the criminal proceedings, and not to post-
verdict new trial motions; and (B) that he also did not sufficiently "raise" 
the claims at issue here to h·igger this procedural bar. Aplt. Br. 12-18. 
A. The previous-litigation procedural bar applied to claims that 
were litigated in the new trial motion in the criminal case. 
The Legislature structured the PCRA to prohibit repetitive and 
belated challenges to a conviction. To that end, it created procedural bars 
and a time bar that require convicted persons to raise their claims at the 
earliest possible time. The procedural bars facilitate this goal by prohibiting 
post-conviction relief on claims that were or could have been raised in an 
earlier proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 788-9-106. In particular, the PCRA 
prohibits relief for any claim that "was raised or addressed at trial or on 
appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1 )(b ). 
As noted, the post-conviction court concluded that this procedural 
bar applied to claims that were litigated in the new h·ial motion in the 
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criminal case. Lynch, however, now argues that a new trial motion is not 
filed" at trial" for purposes of this bar. He reads the phrase" at trial" to only 
refer to the portion of the criminal case where the parties present evidence. 
Aplt. Br. 13-16. 
But when interpreting statutory language, this Court must implement 
the Legislature's intent and avoid absurd results. Berneau v. Martino, 2009 
UT 76, ~12, 233 P.3d 1128. Lynch's reading of "at trial or on appeal" 
violates both principles. 
To discern the Legislature's intent, this Court looks to the statute's 
plain language. See Turner v. Staker & Parson Co., 2012 UT 30, ~12, 284 P.3d 
600. This Court "read[s] the plain language of the statute as a whole" and 
interprets statutory terms "in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters." State 1.1. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ~29, 127 P.3d 682. 
When conducting such an analysis, " [ c ]ontext is a primary 
determinant of meaning." Hon. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law 167 (Thomson/West 2012). It is thus "a familiar policy in the 
construction of terms of a statute to take into consideration the meaning 
naturally attaching to them from the context, and to adopt that sense of the 
words which best harmonizes with the context." Perris v. Perris, 202 P.2d 
731, 733 (Utah 1949); see also Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 
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(1988) (when "ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must 
look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language 
and design of the statute as a whole"). 
Here, the Legislature did not just bar post-conviction petitioners from 
raising claims that were previously raised "at trial." Rather, the Legislature 
barred re-litigation of claims that were "raised or addressed at trial or on 
appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(b) (e1nphasis added). Using the 
words "on appeal" in the same phrase as II at trial" shows that the 
Legislature intended to prohibit re-litigation of claims that were raised 
during the entire criminal case-i.e., during the prosecution or appeal stage 
of the criminal justice process- as opposed to the subsequent post-
conviction case, which is a civil lawsuit filed by the petitioner against the 
State. See Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-102(1) (West 2009). 
Reading II at h·ial and on appeal" to refer to the entire criminal case, 
rather than just the evidence portion of that case, is the only reading 
consistent with the PCRA' s structure and purpose. Utah Code Annotated § 
78B-9-106(1)(b) and (d) both bar any claims that were raised or addressed in 
prior proceedings. The clear import of this is that a claim can only be raised 
once. But reading the phrase "at trial" to refer to only the evidence 
presentation portion of the criminal trial would conflict with that. It would 
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allow a petitioner to get another round of 1nerits litigation on a claim that he 
already litigated and already lost, even if the petitioner has no new evidence 
to support it. Lynch offers no reasoned basis to suppose the Legislature 
intends to allow this. 
Further, Lynch's reading is internally inconsistent. Lynch does not 
argue, for example, that he could have re-litigated the new trial claims if he 
had challenged them on direct appeal. Nor could he, because § -106(1)(b) 
expressly bars re-litigation of claims that were raised "on appeal." But if 
this is so, then Lynch's reading creates a scenario in which the PCRA would 
allow re-litigation of claims- but only if the petitioner chose not to appeal them 
on direct appeal. This reading would, in effect, discourage criminal 
defendants from appealing issues in the first instance. But a "petition for 
post-conviction relief is not a substitute for appellate review." Kell v. State, 
2008 UT 62, if13, 194 P.3d 913. If a "contention of error is known or should 
have been known to the petitioner at the time of judgment, it must be raised 
and appealed through the regular and prescribed procedure, otherwise the 
regular rules of procedure governing appeals would be nullified." Carter v. 
Galetka, 2001 UT 96, if 14, 44 P.3d 626; accord Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, 
~36, 125 P.3d 917. But by arguing for a second round of review on claims 
the loss of which Lynch chose not to appeal, Lynch attempts to do precisely 
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what the law plainly forbids- substitute post-conviction review for the 
appeal. 
Moreover, taking Lynch's restrictive reading of "at trial" to its logical 
conclusion would allow re-litigation of other kinds of previously-litigated 
claims as well. If the phrase "at trial" only refers to the evidence-
presentation proceedings at trial, then claims that were raised before those 
particular proceedings began could likewise be re-litigated in post-
conviction. But under current rules, a number of issues are ordinarily (and 
sometimes mandatorily) resolved before trial begins, including motions for 
severance and motions to suppress evidence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(c)(l)(B), (D), (F); see also Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2)(B) (requiring pretrial 
motions to suppress prior bad acts evidence); Utah R. Evid. 412(c) 
(requiring pretrial motions to ad1nit evidence of a witness's past sexual 
behavior). 
Under Lynch's interpretation of the previous-litigation procedural 
bar, a petitioner who raised any such motion before trial and lost on it could 
then choose to not appeal that ruling, only to then raise it again in post-
conviction without any procedural bar. This approach would ultimately 
"invite[] confusion, piecemeal litigation, a waste of judicial resources, and 
gamesmanship" in criminal litigation. Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames 
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Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ~73, 210 P.3d 263. This cannot be what that the 
Legislature meant when it barred post-conviction claims that were raised or 
addressed" at trial or on appeal." 
None of Lynch's arguments to the conh·ary change this. First, Lynch 
notes that some states use broader language in their procedural bar statutes, 
and he then argues that because the Utah Legislature did not, the phrase "at 
trial" should be interpreted narrowly. Aplt. Br. 14-15. But the question 
before this Court is not what other state legislatures intended with other 
language in other statutory schemes. Instead the question is what the Utah 
Legislature intended when it used this phrase in connection with this 
surrounding language in this particular statute. As discussed, the statutory 
scheme at issue supports a reading of the phrase "at trial" to mean all 
proceedings in the trial court during the criminal case. 
Second, Lynch argues that the Legislature "may have wanted to 
ensure coordination between the scope of § 78B-9-106(1)(b)'s bar and a 
criminal defendant's right to counsel." Aplt. Br. 15. If Lynch means to 
suggest that a defendant does not have access to appointed counsel for a 
post-trial motion for a new trial, he is n1istaken. Indeed, his own case 
illustrates this; as noted, Lynch litigated his new trial motion with the 
assistance of appointed counsel. See PCR1620-26. 
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In any event, a related provision within the PCRA itself suggests that 
this was not the Legislature's intention. In addition to the procedural bars 
discussed above, the PCRA also procedurally bars claims that were raised in 
a previous post-conviction petition. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(d). 
But, by statute, a petitioner is not entitled to counsel during post-conviction 
proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109 (West 2009). Thus, the 
Legislature has already expressed its intention that claims that were 
previously litigated are barred, regardless of whether they were litigated 
with the assistance of counsel. 
Finally, Lynch suggests that the Legislature may have intended to 
give defendants a pass for claims of "ineffective assistance of counsel or 
newly discovered evidence" because those kinds of clailns are "difficult to 
develop and support in a post-trial motion." Aplt. Br. 15. Lynch again cites 
no authority demonstrating that this was the Legislature's intent. And, 
again, Lynch's own case belies this. As discussed, Lynch was aware of the 
alleged problems with his h·ial counsel's perfonnance, raised those claims in 
a timely new trial motion, and had a full evidentiary hearing about them. 
Lynch has not shown what more he could have done in post-conviction that 
he could not do in the new trial motion, let alone that it would have made a 
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difference in the outcome. Lynch is in no position to argue that the 
procedural bar does not apply to hiln on this basis. 
B. The claims that were denied under the previous-litigation bar 
were "raised or addressed" in the new trial motion. 
Lynch next argues that while he "hinted at some of his" claims in the 
new trial proceedings, his arguments were not specific enough to qualify as 
having "raised" them for purposes of the previous-litigation procedural bar. 
Aplt. Br. 17. Lynch argues that the PCRA's standard is synonymous with 
the preservation standard- i.e., that the question is whether he 
"introduce[d] supporting evidence or relevant legal authority" on the claim. 
State v. Earl, 2015 UT 12, ill 9 n.5, 345 P.3d 1153. This Court need not decide 
whether the two standards are, indeed, synonymous because, even if they 
are, the standard was met here with respect to all of the claims that Judge 
Himonas dismissed on this basis. 
1. Truck examination claims. 
Lynch argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not examining the 
truck or retaining an expert to do so. Aplt. Br. 20-23. 
Lynch thoroughly covered this in his new trial motion in the criminal 
case. There, he argued that his trial counsel were ineffective for "fail [ing] to 
have important evidence examined and/ or challenged." PCR1623. He 
claimed that he "repeatedly asked his attorneys to have the h·uck exan1ined 
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by a mechanic to determine its working condition," arguing that an 
examination would have proven that his truck was not able to drive fast 
enough to kill his wife. Id. Lynch also made extensive claims about the 
relationship between h·uck components and Rothermich' s injuries, most 
notably in the hand-drawn diagran1 he submitted. See PCR1628. Lynch also 
elaborated on this in the letter he filed as an addendum to his motion, 
where he made detailed argu1nents about the measurements on his truck 
(including the tow hook) to Rothermich's injuries. R253-56; PCR1634-37. 
Then, in the ruling on the new trial motion, Judge Himonas 
specifically credited Julie George's affidavit, where she attested that Lynch 
specifically asked her not to have the truck examined and test-driven by a 
mechanic. R267. Thus, this issue was clearly raised and ruled on at the 
new h·ial hearing. 
2. Paint claims. 
Lynch argues that his counsel was ineffective for not adequately 
"investigat[ing] the paint found on Victim's clothing" or "consult[ing] or 
call[ing] an expert for the defense." Aplt. Br. 24-26. 
At the new h·ial hearing, Lynch argued that his counsel perfonned 
ineffectively by not "bother[ing] to consider" and "address" alleged 
problems with the State's paint evidence at h·ial. R288:41-42. During her 
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testimony, Julie George specifically addressed her decision not to retain a 
paint expert. R288:72. Thus, the issue was before the court in sufficient 
detail to allow it to rule on the claim. 
Lynch also claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for not cross-
examining State's witnesses about the lack of h·ansfer of oxidized plastic or 
black paint from the grill to Rothermich's clothing and testified about both 
claims at the hearing. R224, 230, 256; 288:19-20, 44-45, 51. Judge Himonas 
specifically rejected these claims in his new trial ruling. R265. 
3. Brian Maxwell and Michelle Ashe. 
Lynch also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
subpoenaing Brian Maxwell and Michelle Ashe to testify about their 
reports of other vehicles in the area at the tilne that Rothermich was killed. 
Aplt. Br. 26-29. 
Lynch specifically raised the claim about Michelle Ashe in his new 
trial motion. R227, 234-35. Lynch and his counsel both testified about this 
at the hearing, and Judge Himonas directly ruled on it. R276; 288:24-25, 76. 
At the new h·ial motion hearing, Lynch did not identify Maxwell by 
name. But he did testify that he "had located at least five, possibly six 
people who had called into the police with other leads of people who could 
have been there," and he faulted his counsel for not exploring those claims 
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and presenting them to the jury more capably. R288:24, 31. Thus, Lynch 
"raised" the general issue during that proceeding. Utah Code Arn1. § 78B-
9-106(1)(b). 8 
II. 
Judge Himonas correctly granted the State's summary 
judgment motion on all of Lynch's ineffective assistance 
claims. 
Judge Himonas alternatively concluded that Lynch's ineffective 
assistance claims-including those barred under the previous-litigation 
procedural bar-should be dismissed as a matter of law. PCR1744-45. 9 
A. Lynch was required to prove ineffective assistance of both trial 
and appellate counsel. 
A post-conviction petitioner is also procedurally barred from 
obtaining relief based on any claim that he could have raised at trial or on 
appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(c). Notwithstanding this 
procedural bar, a petitioner may obtain relief if he demonstrates that "the 
8 In addition to the above issues, Lynch also raises several argmnents 
on appeal about issues relating to the zip ties. The State has not argued that 
those claims were raised or addressed in the new trial proceedings, and the 
State therefore does not contend that those are prohibited by the previous-
litigation procedural bar. 
9 As noted, there is no ineffective assistance exception to the 
procedural bar that applies to claims that were previously litigated. See id. 
§ 78B-9-106(1)(b). Thus, if this Court affirms Judge Himonas's conclusion 
that any of the claims discussed above were previously litigated in the new 
trial proceedings, the analysis of those claims should stop there-i.e., this 
Court should not reach the alternative ineffective assistance arguments 
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failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(3). To establish ineffective assistance, a 
petitioner must prove both deficient performance and prejudice. See 
generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Given that Lynch had new counsel on direct appeal, he could have 
raised his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on appeal. Because of 
this, Lynch was entitled to relief only if he proved that his appellate counsel 
was ineffective for omitting the trial counsel claims on direct appeal. See 
Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ,I25, 293 P.3d 345; Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, ,f 18, 
279 P.3d 396. In this sense, the "appellate counsel claim" acts as "the 
gateway to the otherwise procedurally barred trial counsel claim." Ross, 
2012 UT 93, ,I52. Thus, to "succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim in a post-conviction petition for relief, the petitioner must prove that 
he received ineffective assistance from both his trial counsel and his 
appellate counsel." Gregg, 2012 UT 32, ,I18 (emphasis added)). 
Appellate counsel ineffective assistance: To "prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must prove that 
appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced [hhn]." 
Rhinehart v. State, 2012 UT App 322, i110, 290 P.3d 921. 
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To show deficient performance on such a claim, Lynch must prove 
that his "counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to 
file a merits brief raising them."' Kell, 2008 UT 62, ~25 (quoting Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 (2000)). Lynch must also show that the issue 
should have been" obvious" to appellate counsel "from the trial record." Id. 
at ~42. 
To show prejudice, Lynch must de1nonstrate that there is a 
"reasonable probability" that the omitted claim '"would have likely resulted 
in reversal of his conviction."' Id. at ~25. 
Trial counsel ineffective assistance: To prove deficient performance 
on the trial counsel claim, Lynch was required to identify specific acts or 
omissions that fell outside reasonable professional judg1nent. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-88, 690. Counsel is '"strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment."' Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Lynch could overcome this strong 
presumption only by demonstrating that "there was no conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162 
(emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). 
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There "are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given 
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular 
client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The "question is 
whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under 
'prevailing professional norms,' not whether it deviated from best practices 
or most common custom." Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011); accord 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011). 
To prove prejudice, Lynch had to prove that there was "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Lynch 
could prevail only if the "likelihood of a different result" was "substantial, 
not just conceivable." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112. 
B. Judge Himonas correctly granted summary judgment on the 
truck examination claims. 
Lynch first claims that because his trial counsel "never examined the 
truck, never personally saw it, never tested it," counsel could not" double-
check[ ] the accuracy of the State's" evidence about it. Aplt. Br. 21-22. As 
for prejudice, Lynch claims that if his counsel had examined the truck, they 
·would have learned that (1) "the truck does not have a tow hook on it," (2) 
its hood "was not actually 'faulty,"' and (3) it has "an undamaged grill," all 
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of which he claims would have shown that his truck was not the one that 
ran down his wife. Aplt. Br. 30-33. 
1. Appellate counsel reasonably omitted this trial 
ineffective-assistance claim. 
There are two reasons why appellate counsel could reasonably omit 
this claim. First, it was not meritorious. At the evidentiary hearing on the 
new trial motion, Julie George acknowledged that the defense team did not 
examine Lynch's truck. But she also explained that after she arranged to 
have a mechanic inspect the truck, Lynch asked her not to because he was 
concerned that the inspection would produce evidence that was favorable to 
the State. R288:74-75. Lynch's counsel ca1mot be faulted for acceding to this 
reasoned decision. 
Moreover, Strickland "permits counsel to make a reasonable decision 
that n1akes particular investigations um1ecessary." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 
106. As part of this, counsel may decide to not personally inspect all of the 
evidence, but instead rely on the opinion of experts who have. See, e.g., 
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Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, if 202, 344 P.3d 581; Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, 
if 38, 342 P.3d 182; Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, if 129, 267 P.3d 232. 10 
In Pinlwlster v. Cullen, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1406-07 (2011), the Supreme 
Court accordingly recognized that because of the "wide latitude counsel 
must have in making tactical decisions," "specific guidelines are not 
appropriate" "[b]eyond the general requirement of reasonableness." Thus, 
"Strickland itself rejected the notion that the same investigation will be 
required in every case," and counsel's obligation is therefore to "make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary." Id. ( emphasis in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, counsel is "entitled to formulate a 
strategy that [is] reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in 
accord with effective trial tactics and strategies." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 107. 
Here, George testified that she had a "private investigator" with a 
"background in accident reconsh·uction" assist her with this case, and that 
10 This is also consistent with rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
wherein an expert witness is allowed to base his opinion on "on facts or 
data in the case that the expert has been 1nade aware of or personally 
observed." (Emphasis added). This rule "clearly permits" an expert to 
testify about information that was "made known" to him, including 
infonnation that was not personally "perceived by the expert." Kelley, 2000 
UT 41, if 23. Thus, this rule also contemplates that reasoned conclusions can 
be 1nade about ite1ns that a person did not personally see. 
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she spent "many, many hours" going "through the discovery" on "accident 
reconstruction" with him. R288:69. That discovery included "prior reports 
and evidence" that detectives had put together, as well as photographs. 
R288:66-67. After that review and consultation, George and the expert 
decided not to personally examine the h·uck, instead focusing their time and 
resources elsewhere. On this record, Lynch has not shown that ,.,.no 
reasonably competent attorney would have acted similarly." Harvey v. 
Warden, 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). 
Second, it would not have been obvious to appellate counsel that a 
personal examination by trial counsel would likely have revealed any 
exculpatory information. In his brief, Lynch claims that, if trial counsel had 
investigated more fully, she would have learned that (1) "the truck does not 
have a tow hook on it," (2) that its hood "was not actually 'faulty,"' and (3) 
that it has "an undamaged grill." Aplt. Br. 30-33. 
But Lynch supports this clahn primarily by referring to the affidavits 
that his investigators filed in 2012 when they examined the truck as part of 
the post-conviction case. See Aplt. Br. 30-33; see nlso Rl 128-32. These 
affidavits were not available when appellate counsel prepared her brief in 
2010 and thus cannot be relied on to show that she was ineffective. 
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As for the record that did exist at that time, that record simply does 
not show that it would have been obvious to appellate counsel that any of 
these alleged evidentiary deficiencies existed or would have mattered. With 
the tow hook, for example, multiple witnesses referred to it at trial, but 
Lynch had never argued that the tow hook did not actually exist. See, e.g., 
R283:131; 285:60. Instead, during the new trial proceedings, Lynch himself 
repeatedly referred to the tow hook and made arguments about its height-
thereby suggesting to appellate counsel that it did exist. See R230, 253-54; 
288:47. 
As for the truck's hood, the record contained several sworn 
statements establishing that it did have problems latching. Its original 
owner signed an affidavit stating that it did not latch properly. R285:76-77. 
In his affidavit, Allan Ostler attested that he saw the hood blow open while 
Lynch was driving the truck. R284:213-14. And Detective Anderson 
testified at trial that when he exa1nined the h·uck, the hood did not close 
properly. R283:137. 
Finally, as for lack of damage to the grill, there was nothing to 
examine because the State never claimed at trial that it was damaged. But 
the importance of that fact would not have been obvious on the record. 
Detective Anderson - an expert in accident reconstruction- testified that 
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the truck had "exactly" the kind of damage that he expected to see. 
R283:125. Lynch points to no testimony from any expert that was in the 
record stating that Anderson was wrong about this. Given this, it would 
not have been obvious to appellate counsel that there was a viable 
ineffective assistance claim oh this basis. 
2. Lynch was not prejudiced by the omission of this claim. 
Again, to prevail on his appellate counsel claim, Lynch must also 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that this claim would 
have succeeded on appeal. He cannot. 
First, as discussed, the underlying trial counsel deficient performance 
claim was not meritorious. Instead, the record showed that trial counsel 
employed an expert, looked at photographs of the truck, and decided not to 
conduct a further examination. This was a reasonable decision, and the 
claim was therefore unlikely to succeed on appeal. 
Second, Lynch's proffer failed to prove how further examination of 
the h·uck would have changed the evidentiary picture enough to undermine 
confidence in the verdict. Even with the identified issues, there was still a 
large amount of evidence linking Lynch's truck to Rothennich' s murder. 
This included the broken zip tie that was found in the roadway that had a 
fracture line that matched a zip tie fragment found in Lynch's truck; spray 
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paint on the truck's rust spots that had the same chemical composition as 
paint that transferred to Rothermich' s clothes; base coat paint on the truck 
that had the same chemical composition as paint that transferred to 
Rothermich' s clothes; and damage to its hood and windshield that was not 
there when Lynch bought it but was there a few weeks later when it was 
discovered shortly after the murder. 
Moreover, Lynch's actions after the 1nurder gave the jury ample 
reason to believe that he was the culprit. Lynch spoke openly about 
expecting to receive insurance money from his wife's death. Lynch's grief 
curiously ca1ne and went in the i111111ediate aftermath-he was grieving to 
the point of physical disability that afternoon when he was in public, but 
was then able to cancel a dilmer date with his girlfriend that night without 
showing any emotion. Lynch repeatedly lied to his girlfriend about having 
a wife. Lynch repeatedly lied to police about owning the truck that killed 
his wife, and also took extensive steps to hide the truck's existence from 
everyone. 
Given all this, the record does not show that, if counsel had more 
thoroughly examined the h·uck, there was a reasonable probability that 
Lynch would have been acquitted. 
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C. Judge Himonas correctly granted summary judgment on the 
zip tie claims. 
Lynch faults trial counsel's decisions to not test the zip ties for the 
presence of paint or "evaluate how" they were "placed on the truck or 
found at the crime scene." Aplt. Br. 23-24. 
1. Paint on zip tie. 
At trial, Detective Anderson testified that he saw what appeared to be 
white paint within the locking mechanism of a zip tie. R283:83; 284:11. The 
zip ties were ad1nitted as trial exhibits, as was a photograph of the zip tie 
that had paint on it. See R285:30-41, 105; see also State's Trial Exh's 77, 78. 
Lynch now claims that trial counsel should have had the zip tie tested 
to determine whether the white substance was actually paint. But the 
record shows that appellate counsel properly exercised her discretion to 
on1it this claim because it was not meritorious. 
At the new trial evidentiary hearing, George testified that, "based on 
the photographs" of the zip ties, she "did not feel like any independent 
analysis" of them. was necessary. R288:73. This was a reasonable exercise of 
her discretion- particularly given how she later used the lack of testing to 
the defense's advantage. 
On cross-examination of one of the detectives who worked on the 
case, George elicited an admission that officers never had the white 
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substance on the zip tie tested. R285:122-23. She also elicited an admission 
that, as a result, nothing in the paint analyst's report matched the paint from 
Lynch's truck to the white substance on the zip tie. Id. In closing argument, 
she emphasized, "They couldn't even match the paint on the zip ties to the 
paint that they say was frmn this truck and from the spray paint cans. No 
match. No nothing. Okay?" R285:174. 
This kind of tactical approach was endorsed by the Su pre me Court in 
Harrington. There, the petitioner similarly faulted his counsel for not using 
an expert to challenge a particular issue. 562 U.S. at 111. But the Supreme 
Court stressed that "Strickland does not enact Newton's third law for the 
presentation of evidence, requiring for every prosecution expert an equal 
and opposite expert from the defense." Id. Instead, in "many instances 
cross-examination will be sufficient to expose defects in an expert's 
presentation. When defense counsel does not have a solid case, the best 
strategy can be to say that there is too much doubt about the State's theory 
for a jury to convict." Id. Thus, "it is difficult to establish ineffective 
assistance when counsel's overall performance indicates active and capable 
advocacy," such as when counsel "conducted a skillful cross-examination" 
and "elicited concessions from the State's experts" about "weaknesses" in 
their conclusions. Id. 
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Moreover, if counsel here had the zip tie tested but the result then 
linked the white substance on the tie to the paint on Lynch's truck, she 
would have lost this ability to challenge to the State's evidence. Thus, if 
trial counsel had chosen the course Lynch says she should have, she may 
have simultaneously foreclosed an argument on a forensic weakness and 
added another link between Lynch's truck and the zip tie found at the 
scene. Her decision not to risk this was objectively reasonable, and 
appellate counsel could reasonably decide not to raise this as an issue. 
Further, Lynch proffered nothing below to show that appellate 
counsel could have proven prejudice. Specifically, he proffered nothing that 
showed that if the zip tie had been tested, the test would have shown that 
the white substance was not paint that matched the paint on his truck. 
This failure is fatal. "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel 
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." State v. 
Munguia, 2011 UT 5, if 30, 253 P.3d 1082. Because of this, a post-conviction 
petitioner does not carry his burden of proving prejudice unless he 
affirmatively proffers proof of what evidence would have been presented if 
counsel had performed competently. See Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, if 60, 
156 P.3d 739. Thus, a defendant "cannot meet the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test simply by identifying unexplored avenues of investigation. 
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Rather, he must demonstrate a reasonable probability that further 
investigation would have yielded sufficient information to alter the 
outcome" of his case. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523-24 (Utah 1994). 
And, finally, Lynch never accounts for the other evidence linking him 
to his wife's murder, let alone shows that proving that the white substance 
was not paint from his truck would have undermined confidence in the trial 
outcome. Because of this, he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the 
alleged error. 
2. Proof of how the zip ties were used on the truck. 
Lynch also argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective 
for not arguing that, because the hood actually worked fine, there was no 
need for zip ties to help secure it. 
But appellate counsel could readily decide not to raise this claim. The 
primary reason is that the trial record showed that the hood did not latch 
properly. As noted, the truck's prior owner filed an affidavit stating that 
the "hood latch was not working properly," Detective Anderson testified at 
trial that it did not" fully latch," and Allen Ostler attested that he once saw 
its hood blow open while Lynch was driving it. R283:137; 284:214; 285:76. 
Moreover, the truck's original owner and Anderson both testified that 
they saw two new holes that had been drilled into the h·uck. R283:137-38; 
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285:77. Police also discovered metal shavings on the carpet where Lynch 
kept the truck during the weeks before the murder, suggesting that Lynch 
had drilled holes into the hood to secure it with something like a zip tie. 
Given all this, Lynch cannot show that every reasonable defense 
attorney would have argued that there was no basis for believing that zip 
ties were used to secure the hood of Lynch's truck. Appellate counsel 
therefore could reasonably have decided to omit this claim. 
3. Discovery of zip ties at scene. 
Finally, Lynch claims that counsel was ineffective for not asserting 
that the zip ties were not actually discovered at the murder scene. But as 
discussed, several witnesses described seeing them there, and the jury was 
given photographs from the crilne scene showing them in the roadway. 
R283:81, 84-85. Given this, Lynch cannot show that it would have been 
obvious to appellate counsel that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
arguing that the zip ties somehow were not actually there. 
D. Judge Himonas correctly granted summary judgment on the 
paint issues. 
Lynch claimed that his trial counsel should have retained a defense 
paint expert and made certain additional paint-based arguments about the 
grill. Aplt. Br. 24-26. 
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1. Paint expert. 
Lynch's proffer failed to prove that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for not arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring a defense 
paint expert. 
The primary reason is that the underlying trial claim was not 
meritorious. In any criminal case, there are "any number of hypothetical 
experts-specialists in psychiah7, psychology, ballistics, fingerprints, tire 
treads, physiology, or numerous other disciplines and subdisciplines-
whose insight might possibly" be useful to the defense. Harrington, 562 U.S. 
at 106. But the Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to consult every 
potentially useful expert in every case. Instead, counsel is "entitled to 
formulate a strategy that [is] reasonable at the time and to balance limited 
resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies." Id. While 
there are cases in which "the only reasonable and available defense strategy 
requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert" testilnony, 
those situations are "[r]are." Id. 
Here, trial counsel testified that that she, the private investigator, and 
Lynch began discussing the paint issues about a 111011th before h4 ial and 
ultimately decided that an expert would be unhelpful, primarily because 
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the State's expert analysis did not definitively link the paint on Lynch's 
truck to the paint found on Rothermich' s clothing. R288:72. 
This choice was reasonable. After all, as Lynch repeatedly emphasizes 
on appeal, the State's paint analyst had concluded that the paint from the 
h·uck was the same type of paint that was found on the victim's clothing, 
but the expert was not willing to definitively say that it came from the same 
batch of paint. See R284:181, 199-202. Given this, counsel could reasonably 
decide to "balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and 
strategies" by not retaining an expert on this issue, thereby allowing her to 
focus limited time and resources elsewhere. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 106. 11 
11 In his brief, Lynch claims that the State's counsel "play[ed] fast and 
loose" when it described this evidence in its brief on direct appeal. In 
support, Lynch points to a single line from the State's brief, wherein it 
argued that prosecutors "proved" that "paint from Defendant's truck ended 
up on [Rothermich's] clothing" during the fatal hit-and-run. Aplt. Br. 25. 
On direct appeal from a jury verdict, however, this Court "assun1e[ s] 
that the jury believed the evidence supporting" the conviction. State v. 
Syvongsa, 2012 UT App 277, ii 6, 288 P.3d 43. Moreover, the State is given 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. ldrees, 
2014 UT App 76, if 10,324 P.3d 651. 
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Lynch also failed as a matter of law to show that appellate counsel 
could have proven prejudice. Lynch never proffered any evidence of what 
a defense paint analysis would have even said, let alone attempt to show 
that this un-proffered evidence would have so markedly differed from the 
State's evidence that it would have undermined confidence in the outcome. 
But again, "proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Munguia, 2011 UT 
5, ,I30. Here, in the absence of any proof of his own, Lynch did nothing 
more than ask the court to speculate that he was prejudiced on this issue. 
The dish·ict court correctly refused to do so. 
Here, the paint analyst testified that paint "fragments" found on 
Rothennich' s clothing came from the "same distinct type of paint as that on 
the hood of the truck" and that they also matched that paint on multiple 
microscopic layers. R284:181, 200, 202. She further testified that paint 
smears on the back of Rothermich' s pants came from the "same distinct 
type" of spray paint that was used on Lynch's truck. R284:199. Moreover, 
officers found evidence that Lynch had been using white spray paint in the 
very spot where he kept his h·uck in the weeks before Rothermich was 
struck. R283:115; 284:218-19. And officers also found several cans of white 
spray paint when they searched Lynch's house. R285:65, 131, 135. 
When this evidence was combined with all the other evidence that 
very directly linked Lynch to his truck and then linked Lynch's h·uck to the 
collision that killed Rothermich, it was more than reasonable to argue on 
appeal that the State had proven that the paint found on Rothermich's 
clothing came from Lynch's truck. Indeed, in context, this may well have 
been the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence 
that was presented at h·ial. 
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2. Grill issues. 
Lynch next argues that his h·ial counsel should have cross-examined 
the State's expert about the lack of transfer ( of either oxidized plastic or 
black paint) from the truck's grill to the back of Rothermich' s clothing. 
Aplt. Br. 25-26. 
First, as with the paint issue discussed above, nothing in this record 
would have made it obvious to appellate counsel that this was a viable 
issue. For example, there is no expert analysis in the record demonstrating 
that there should have been such transfers given the height of the victim 
relative to the particular way that she was struck. But by contrast, there was 
testimony from Detective Anderson-an expert in automobile accidents-
who said that having viewed all the evidence, he believed this truck was the 
one that struck Rothermich. 
In the absence of any expert analysis, trial counsel could reasonably 
have surmised that if she had cross-exa1nined Anderson about the lack of 
h·ansfers from the grill, those questions may have backfired. Anderson niay 
have explained why those particular substances don't transfer as easily as 
paint, or he could have instead explained why they would have been 
unlikely to transfer given the angles involved here. In the absence of any 
proof to the contrary, this record provides no basis for concluding that it 
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would have been obvious to appellate counsel that trial counsel performed 
deficiently. 
Second, this record shows no prejudice. Again, Lynch points to no 
fact that exists anywhere in this record that demonstrates as a non-
speculative matter that, if these questions had been asked, they would have 
produced exculpatory answers. Moreover, as discussed, there was a wide 
array of evidence linking Lynch and his truck to this collision. Thus, there 
is not a reasonable probability that this claim, if raised, would have resulted 
in reversal. 
E. Judge Himonas correctly granted summary judgment on the 
Maxwell and Ashe claims. 
Finally, Lynch argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
calling Brian Maxwell or Michelle Ashe as witnesses at trial. Aplt. Br. 26-29. 
As recognized by Judge Himonas when he rejected this claim during 
the new trial proceedings, however, trial counsel consciously decided to 
introduce their reports through cross-examination of State's witnesses, 
thereby creating the" obvious advantage" of allowing the jury to hear about 
them while "making it difficult for the State to contest facts favorable to 
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Lynch." R265. Because this was a reasonable tactical decision, this claim 
fails as a matter of law. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,i 6.12 
These claims also fail for lack of prejudice. Lynch proffered no direct 
evidence below of what the jury in the criminal case would have heard from 
Maxwell and Ashe that it did not hear at trial, nor did he demonstrate that 
this yet-undefined missing testimony would have his guilt into doubt so 
much as to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
Moreover, Lynch's claim about these witnesses is ultimately 
speculative. With respect to Maxwell, Lynch's theory is that, despite all the 
evidence linking Lynch and his truck to this collision, a jury would have 
acquitted hiln if it had just heard that someone in the area saw a red truck 
driving in the area sometime after the collision. And with respect to Ashe, 
12 Lynch also misses the point somewhat when he argues that trial 
counsel was incorrect when she opined that Ashe' s testimony would have 
been inadmissible hearsay. Lynch claims that the statements were 
admissible as statements against interest. Aplt. Br. 28 n.2 (citing Utah R. 
Evid. 804(b)(3)). But the initial issue isn't whether counsel's assess1nent of 
the hearsay analysis was correct; rather, the issue is whether her assessment 
was within the realm of reasonable professional judgment. 
It was. The rule that Lynch relies on is not satisfied solely if the 
statement is against the declarant's penal interest; rather, it also requires 
"corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness." Id. 
Here, Lynch has yet to even identify the person who allegedly made the 
statement that Ashe allegedly overheard, let alone offer corroborating proof 
showing that this alleged statement was trustworthy. Because of this, trial 
counsel could reasonably believe that it vvas inadmissible. 
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his theory is that the jury would have disregarded all of the evidence that 
very specifically linked him to this crime if it had just learned that Ashe 
heard an unidentified person confess to being involved in an unidentified 
collision later that day. 
Again, Lynch can prevail only by pointing to evidence that proves 
that a different result at trial would have been "substantial, not just 
conceivable." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112. He has not done so. 
III. 
Judge Himonas correctly denied Lynch's newly discovered 
evidence claim. 
As discussed, Terry Steed and Benjamin Warren claimed that during 
their February 2012 inspection of the truck, (1) Detective Anderson told 
them that there "were not any zip ties on the truck, but that zip ties were 
merely used to secure parts of Lynch's h·uck in h·ansport once it was 
obtained" for examination; and (2) they saw "no apparent functional use for 
zip ties on the truck," the truck's hood worked fine, and the truck "did not 
have a tow hook." 
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Himonas denied this newly 
discovered evidence claim. Aplt. Br. 37-40. Lynch now challenges that 
ruling. 
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But as an initial matter, Lynch understates his burden. He claims that 
he was entitled to relief if the newly discovered evidence was "such as to 
render a different result probable on retrial." Aplt. Br. 38. Lynch draws this 
standard from Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, ,114, 52 P.3d 1168. But Julian 
described the standard that existed "under the post-conviction relief case 
law in effect prior to the enactment of the PCRA." Id. at ,113. 
Under the PCRA, however, the newly discovered evidence must be 
such that, "viewed with all the other evidence ... no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the petitioner guilty" of the offense. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-9-104(1)(e)(iv). Thus, even when newly discovered evidence is "very 
favorable" to the petitioner's case, reversal is not warranted if a "jury could 
rationally disbelieve" the new testimony "in view of other evidence 
implicating" the petitioner. Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, ,118, 61 P.3d 
978. This is the case here. 
A. The alleged recantation. 
Steed and Warren both initially testified that Detective Anderson told 
then1 that officers didn't find zip ties at the scene, but that officers 
then1selves had brought and used the zip ties when transporting the h·uck. 
PCR2096:18, 38-41. Given that Anderson had testified otherwise at trial, 
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Steed and Warren were essentially claiming that Anderson admitted to 
committing perjury during his h·ial testimony. 
But the evidence as a whole did not support their claim about 
Anderson's alleged admission. First, Steed himself backed off of it during 
cross-examination, where he admitted that he could not "say, in all honesty 
and without any reservation, that it was absolutely" Anderson who made 
the comment about the zip ties. PCR2096:32. State's counsel asked: "So if 
I'm understanding you correctly, you're saying that you're not entirely sure 
that Detective Anderson made any of those statements?" PCR2096:33-34. 
Steed's response was: "I am not entirely sure." PCR2096:34. 
Second, Steed's account also suffered because of his insistence that 
Robbie Ipson also told him that "[w]e brought the zip ties." PCR2096:20. 
But in his testimony, Ipson denied saying this. PCR2096:104. And for good 
reason: Ipson is a civilian employee in charge of evidence retention, not 
evidence collection. PCR2096:102-03. Because of this, Ipson testified that he 
never went to this scene and had no personal knowledge of how the 
evidence was collected. PCR2096:103-04. Thus, Steed's account was 
hnplausible, given that he was suggesting that Ipson said something that 
Ipson would have had no basis or reason to ever say. 
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Third, Warren's account suffered from a different defect. As noted, 
he claimed that Anderson told him that officers "had actually used those 
zip-ties on the truck at the scene of the accident." PCR2096:41 ( emphasis 
added). But no one who was personally involved in this investigation 
would have said this, because the truck was not found "at the scene of the 
accident." Instead, the truck was found several days later in an abandoned 
garage-a detail that would have been obvious to someone like Detective 
Anderson who was personally involved in the investigation. 
Fourth, during his testimony, Anderson repeatedly and emphatically 
denied telling Warren or Steed that the zip ties were not discovered at the 
crime scene. PCR2096:86-88. As Judge Himonas later noted, it "defies 
common sense" to suggest that Anderson would have ever made such a 
statement to Lynch's investigators, given that Anderson would have been 
11 openly admit[ing] to committing a major felony." PCR2096:142. 
Because of Anderson's denial, Steed and Warren's testin1ony would 
have ultimately created, at most, a credibility contest for the jury. But 
because the jury "could rationally disbelieve" Warren and Steed and instead 
believe Anderson, Lynch failed to meet the newly discovered evidence 
standard. Wickham, 2002 UT 72, iJ18. 
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Finally, the underlying claim- that the zip ties were planted- was 
manifestly implausible. Anderson testified that when he arrived at the 
collision scene, there were "probably, 10, 15 people" already there. 
PCR2096:49. Moreover, in addition to Anderson's testimony about finding 
the zip ties, Detective Stewart also testified that he was there when they 
were discovered. PCR2096:109. This was supported by photographs that 
were taken at the crime scene showing the zip ties in the roadway while the 
investigation was going on behind them. PCR2096:75-78. 
Thus, Lynch's claim is that, for no apparent reason, Anderson and 
Stewart planted evidence against him, staged photographs to back it up, 
and then lied at trial. But as Judge Himonas noted, "there's absolutely no 
evidence, whatsoever, in this record" to suggest that any this actually 
occurred. PCR2096:145. Because of this, a jury could readily have 
disbelieved Steed and Warren's claim about Anderson's alleged recantation, 
and this claim therefore provided no basis for vacating the conviction. 
B. The physical inspection. 
Steed and Warren also testified that during their inspection, the hood 
worked fine and that they saw no need for zip ties. PCR2096:19, 37. But 
this did not qualify as newly discovered evidence. To qualify, Lynch was 
required to prove that the evidence "could not have been discovered 
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through the exercise of reasonable diligence" "at the time of trial or 
sentencing." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-104(1)(e)(i). But if the observations 
from Steed and Warren in 2012-were consistent with the truck's condition at 
the time of the murder, those observations could have been discovered then. 
But if they were not consistent with its condition at the time of the murder, 
they would have been irrelevant. 
In any event, this testiinony does not prove that no reasonable juror 
could have found Lynch guilty. 
First, by their own admissions, Warren and Steed's observations 
about the hood were decidedly incomplete. At the evidentiary hearing, 
both admitted that they never drove the h·uck and never saw it driven. 
PCR2096:22, 39. This was critical. The issue in this case isn't whether the 
hood stays latched when the truck is standing still. Rather, the issue is 
whether the hood stays latched when it is driven at high speeds. On this, 
Warren and Steed both admitted that they had no personal knowledge. 
By conh·ast, those with firsthand knowledge about this consistently 
said that the hood was not secure when the h·uck was being driven. This 
included the h·uck' s original owner, who submitted an affidavit stating that 
the hood did not latch properly, as well as Allen Ostler, who saw the hood 
blow open one day while Lynch was driving it. R284:213-14; R285:76-77. 
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Second, Steed and Warren did not definitively establish that there 
was no need for zip ties to secure the h·uck' s hood. Warren and Steed both 
agreed that there was a place for the zip ties on the truck: the grill. Warren 
agreed that it was "possible the zip-ties could have been attached" to the 
grill. PCR2096:40. Steed went further, agreeing that "the grill, itself, could 
have had 30 or 40 of them on there had that been what they had been used 
for." PCR2096:23. 
And as Judge Himonas succinctly pointed out in his ruling: "Who 
cares? It doesn't matter whether or not the hood was tied down." 
PCR2096:143. The State had already proven (by both photographs and 
testhnony) that there were zip ties in the road and that they matched the zip 
tie fragment found in Lynch's truck. Thus, even if the zip ties were not 
actually used to secure the hood itself, a jury could reasonably conclude that 
they were on the truck for something. That was enough. 
Finally, Lynch also points to Steed and Warren's testimony that they 
saw no tow hook on the truck in February 2012. But as discussed, the 
existence of the tow hook was never disputed by anyone - including 
Lynch-during the criminal case. See R230, 253-54; R283:131; 285:60, 67; 
288:47. Indeed, Lynch himself tacitly admitted that it existed when he 
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personally made arguments about its height in his handwritten new trial 
filing. R253-54; 288:47. 
True, Warren and Steed apparently saw no tow hook in February 
2012. But Lynch never proved that they saw the truck in the same condition 
it was in when Rothermich was killed. Rather, by the time they saw it, the 
truck had been at least partially disassembled during the investigation, a 
fact confirmed by pictures provided in Lynch's own petition. See PCR356-
64; see also State's Exh. 2, Lynch Exh.' s 9 & 10 (post-conviction evidentiary 
hearing) (showing the grill and bumper having been removed from the 
truck). Given this, it is possible that the tow hook had been removed. 
But more importantly, the absence of a tow hook is not fatal to the 
State's case. At trial, some witnesses referred to the tow hook as a possible 
cause for Rothennich's leg injuries. But the State never alleged that this was 
the only possible cause for those injuries. Instead, witnesses also repeatedly 
suggested that the truck's spoiler may have caused them. In his testin1ony 
at trial, for exa1nple, Anderson testified that the spoiler measured between 
11 to 15 inches, which he then correlated with Rothermich's leg injuries. 
R283:135. The State also inh·oduced a photograph of the spoiler, and 
Anderson told the jury that "we thought" it "could have possibly created 
that injury as well." R283:131. The State's DNA expert also supported this 
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theory, testifying that unidentifiable female DNA was found from both over 
and under the spoiler. R285:22. During closing arguments, the prosecutor 
linked Rothermich' s calf injuries to the spoiler, not the tow hook. R285:153, 
190. 
The bottom line is this: Lynch's two witnesses gave equivocal 
testimony that was in many respects contrary to much of the evidence in 
this case. Even if the jury had heard it, it could have still rationally 
disbelieved those investigators, relied on all of the other evidence 
implicating Lynch in this crime, and still convicted him. Judge Himonas 
correctly denied this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the dismissal and 
denial of Lynch's post-conviction petition. 
Respectfully submitted on May 18, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
~~, D-1~ 
RY Ar~H6. TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief-Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
( d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could 
have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107. 
(2) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including 
during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court 
determines that the state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an earlier 
time. Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided 
that it gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that 
the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to 
raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief-Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been 
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of 
original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or 
sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for 
which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling 
statutory provisions; 
( d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States 
Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the 
conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial 
or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion 
or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of 
the offense or subject to the sentence received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United 
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after 
conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal, and that: 
(i) the rule ,vas dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or 
sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for 
·which the petitioner was convicted . 
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner 
establishes that there ,,vould be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in 
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light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence 
and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing. 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner 
is innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, 
Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Post-Conviction Determination of 
Factual Innocence. 
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.... .. ~ 
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Stlfe offff~'6····-
.-.; 
SHERMAN ALEXANDER LYNCH, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, 
Case No. 110913691 
vs. 
.. 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
I 
This matter.is before the Court'bn Respondent the State ofUtah,s (the State) Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In the motion,·the State seeks the dismissal of Petitioner Sherman Lynch's 
remaining claims for relief under Utah's Postconviction Remedies Act (the PCRA), see Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101, et seq. (2013). For the reasons set forth below, I DENY the motion 
with respect to the newly discovered evidence claim, and GRANT the motion with respect to the 
other claims. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Lynch's wife, Patricia Rothennic, was killed in 2007 when a vehicle struck her from 
behind. Lynch was charged with murdering bis wife and, at the conclusion of a trial in 2009, a 
jury convicted him on that charge. Following his trial, Lynch filed a post-trial motion for a new 
trial on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that newly discovered 
evidence justified holding a new trial. The trial court denied that motion. Lynch then appealed 
his conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals, which affirmed Lynch's conviction.1 See State v. 
Lynch, 2011 UT App 1, 246 P.3d 525. 
Shortly after the court of appeals affirmed his conviction, Lynch filed a petition for 
postconviction relief in this Court. Through counsel, Lynch subsequently filed two amended 
petitions. In his second amended petition (the Second Amended Petition), Lynch claims that he 
is entitled to relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered 
evidence. The State previously filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of 
Lynch's claims. At a hearing on the motion, the Court did not reach the merits of Lynch's 
claims but denied the motion without prejudice and allowed the state to refile its motion for 
summary judgment. 2 
1 Apparently, Lynch did not seek appellate review of the trial court's ruling on his motion for a new trial, as that 
motion and the issues associated therewith are not discussed in the cowt of appeals' ruling. Following lht: court of 
appeals' ruling, Lynch did not pursue further review from the Utah Supreme Court. 
2 In~ separate but relat~d case, Lynch v. State, Case No. 110913690, Lynch claimed that he was entitled to 
postconviction relief O!l factual innocence grollilds. The Cour.t granted the State's motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed that case!at the same hearing where the Court denied the State's motion in the case at bar. 
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ANALYSIS 
In their current motion, the State argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the 
remaining claims because Lynch cannot prevail on bis ineffective assistance of counsel and 
newly discovered evidence claims. "Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.,,, Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 1 13, 177 P .3d 600 
( quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56( c )). As the party moving for summary judgment, the State has the 
burden to "show bpth that there is no material issue of fact and that the [State] is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 1 10, 177 P .3d 600. 
Here, Lynch makes no attempt to controvert the State's numbered statement of facts, and 
therefore, I presume that the facts asserted by the State are true.3 See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3). 
The State argues that the undisputed facts establish that Lynch's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are procedurally barred or fail on the merits, and that his newly discovered evidence claim 
fails on the merits. I address each of these arguments in turn. 
L The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
Turning first to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the State correctly notes that 
under the PCRA, postconviction relief is not available on a ground for relief that has been 
"raised or addressed at trial or on appeal."4 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(b) (2013). A 
petitioner is also barred from asserting relief on a ground that "could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on-appeal," id § 78B-9-106(l)(c), unless ''the failure to raise that ground was 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel," id. § 78B-9-106(3); see also id. (providing that the 
ineffective assistance exception only applies to a claim for relief under subsection-106(l)(c)). 
Thus, under the PCRA, claims that have previously been raised before a trial or appellate court 
are barred, regardless of whether those claim~ are now raised as a part of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. In contras~ claims that could have been but were not raised 
previously are barred unless the faill;lfC to raise those claims was attributable to the ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Moreover, before·addressing the merits of a claim for postconviction 
3 In his opposition memorandum, Lynch does object to several of the State's asserted facts on the grounds that the 
facts are vague or unsupported. However, all of the actual facts in the State's memorandum are supported by 
citations to the record that make the source and context of the infonnation clear. Therefore, I DENY Lynch's 
objections to the State's asserted facts. I also note that Lynch does provide his own list ofwidisputed facts in his 
opposition memorandum. Those facts appear largely to be a summary of the allegations contained in the Second 
Amended Petition and most of the facts in Lynch's statement of undisputed facts are not supported by a citation to 
the ~ecord. Regardless, even considering the facts asserted by Lynch in their entirety, those facts do not change the 
resolution of the issues-currently before the Court. 
4 Lynch argues that because the PCRA uses the phrase "at trial," Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106(l)(b), that bar does 
not apply to matters raised in post-trial motions. I disagree and reject that argument. As the State explains in its 
reply memorandum, the phrases "at trial" and "on appeal" in the PCRA id., do not refer only to the matters raised at 
trial or on appeal. Rather, those phrases are clearly meant to refer broadly to the trial and appellate stages of 
criminal litigation, which includes matters raised in post-trial motions before a trial court. Moreover, the apparent 
purpose of the procedural bars in the PCRA is tc prevent a petitioner from repeatedly raising the same claims in a 
postconviction proceecijng after first raising ~em in a trial or appellate court. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
explained, the PCRA is not intended to be a substitute for appellate review, nor is the PCRA intended to give a 
petitioner a proverbial second bite at the apple and give them a second opportunity to obtain appellate review. See 
Ke/Iv. State, 2008 UT 62, ~ 13, 194 P.3d 913; C'Jrterv. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 1J 14, 44 P.3d 626. 
2 
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relief, a court must first "determine whether that claim is independently precluded under Section 
78B-9-106." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b). Accordingly, I begin my analysis of Lynch's ineffective 
assistance of counsel's claims by addressing the question of whether his claims are barred. 
Here, the State argues that several of Lynch's ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
were previously raised and that his remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail on the 
merits. I agree. 
A. Several of Lynch's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Are Barred Under 
Subsection -106(1)(b). 
Turning first to the claims already raised, as the State has established, many of Lynch's 
ineffective assistance of cowisel claims.have already been raised by Lynch in previous 
proceedings before this court and the court of appeals. These include Lynch's first, second, 
third, fourth, eleventh, sixteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, 
and twenty-third claims for relief.5 The essence of the grounds underlying each of these claims 
has previously been raised in either Lynch's motion for a new trial or on appeal. Therefore, 
these claims are barred under the PCRA. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106(1)(b). 
B. Lynch's Remaining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Are Barred and 
Fail as a Matter of Law. 
With respect to the remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the State asserts 
that these claims ate barred wider subsection -106(1)(c) because those claims could have been 
raised at trial. In doing so, the State also acknowledges that under the PCRA, the procedural bar 
does not apply to subsection - I 06(1 ){ c) if the failure to raise those claims was due to ineffective 
assistance of cowisel. See id § 78:S-9:. l 06(3). Consequently, the question of whether those 
claims are barred is necessarily dependent upon a determination of the merits of Lynch's 
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Given that fact, I address the merits of the 
remaining claims and the procedural bar simultaneously. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a criminal 
defendant has the right to have the assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI. In order 
to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial, the United States Supreme Court "has 
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the 
"Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,681 (1986). Therefore, a party seeking to overturn their conviction on the 
ground that they reGeived ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate two prongs: "First, 
the defendant must.show that cowisel's performance was deficient," and "[s]econd, that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
To satisfy the first Strickland prong, a criminal defendant "'must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard ofrnasonableness,"' which "is to be determined 
5 The State acknowledges that portions of Lynch's third, fourth, and twenty-first claims for postconviction relief 
may not have been expressly raised previously. While I agree with the State that the essence of these claims was 
largely raised in previous proceedings, I address the claim in connection with both subsection -106{1)(b) and 
subsection -106( I)( c ). 
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by 'prevailing professional norms."' Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ,i 28, 194 P.3d 913 (quoting 
Stricklcind, 466 U.S. at 688). In evaluating counsel's performance, a court must evaluate that 
performance in light of the totality of the circumstances, "with 'a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' Id. 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Indeed, a criminal defendant bears the burden of 
"overcom[ing] the 'strong presumption.that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by 
persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. 
Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,i 6, 89 P.3d 162 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (second 
alteration in original). 
Similarly, to satisfy the second Strickland prong, a criminal defendant must establish that 
counsel's performance was prejuqicial by "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Stated another way, a 
"defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694; accord Kell, 2008 UT 
62, ,i 29. Likewise, a petitioner like Lynch who claims that "appellate counsel was ineffective in 
failing to raise a cfo.im ... must show that the 'issue [was] obvious from the trial record and ... 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal." Kell, 2008 UT 62, ,i 42 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration and second omission in original). 
In this case, the State has met its burden of demonstrating that Lynch ca.'111ot maintain his 
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims. With respect to the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, 
seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, twenty-first, twenty-fourth, 
twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, and twenty-eighth claims, the State has shown that 
Lynch's previous counsel had a conceivable tactical basis or justification for failing to take the 
actions in question.6 These bases include that that the actions in question would have been futile, 
that the actions may have backfired or been harmful to the defense, that the evidence had already 
been presented by other witnesses, that the actions would have focused on weaker arguments, 
that the available record evidence would not have alerted trial counsel to a potential issue, that 
any error by trial counsel would not have been obvious to Lynch's appellate counsel, and that a 
challenge to various statements by the prosecution and prosecution witnesses would be futile 
because those statements were accurate.7 
·1 
In response to the State's argi..Iment, Lynch does not separately respond to each of the 
claims discussed in the State's memorandum, nor does he separately address the tactical bases 
identified by the State in connection with_ each claim. Rather, Lynch argues that his previous 
counsel should have taken other actions that would have been more effective. In doing so, 
however, Lynch largely fails to provide the Court with any evidence to challenge the State's 
assertions that Lyn.ch's defense counsel had reasonable tactical bases for their failure to take the 
6 I also note that the State has offered evidence to show that a·. least some of counsel's alleged failures were actually 
performed by counsel, including counsel's cross-examination of witnesses, counsel's investigation of Lynch's 
claims, and counsel's retention ofan investigator with the nec:!ssary training to investigate Lynch's technical claims. 
7 Rather than repeating the State's argument with respect to each of those claims separately, I incorporate by 
reference the State's aripunent on those claims. 
4 
174 j Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
actions in question. 8 Therefore, Lynch has not met his burden on summary judgment of 
presenting any evidence to controvert the State's assertions that previous counsel had tactical 
reasons for failing to take the actions that are the subject of Lynch's petition for postconviction 
relief. Moreover, after reviewing of each of the claims discussed in the State's supporting 
memorandum, I agree with the State that defense counsel had a legitimate reason for failing to 
take each of the ac~ions in question. Consequently, as a matter oflaw, Lynch cannot satisfy the 
first prong of the Strickland test. 
Furthermore, even if Lynch could satisfy the first Strickland prong, he is unable to 
satisfy the prejudice prong for similar reasons. As discussed above and in the State's supporting 
memorandum, many of the actions in question would have been futile and, in any event, the 
resulting evidence was squarely contradicted by the great weight of the other credible evidence 
credible sources. Therefore, as a matter oflaw, Lynch is unable show that if his trial or appellate 
counsel would have taken other action, Lynch would have prevailed at trial or on appeal. 
In accordance with the foregoing, I GRANT the State's motion for summary judgment on 
Lynch's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
II. The Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
Next, the State argues that Lynch's newly discovered evidence claim, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-9-104(1 )( e ), fails as a matter of law. I disagree. 
Under the PCRA, a petitioner seeking postconviction relief on newly discovered evidence 
grounds must show that 
newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner·nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the 
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-
conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that 
was known; 
8 Lynch does assert that under Utah law, counsel's failure to call a witness is not a legitimate tactic. However, in the 
first case cited by Lynch, it was not the failure to call a witness but counsel's failure to investigate that was deficient. 
See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188-89 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court further emphasized that after a 
sufficiem inquiry or investigation, it may be a reasonable tactic for counsel to refrain from calling a witness but such 
a decision may only be.made after undertaking an investigation. See id. at 189. The other case cited by Lynch, 
State v. Charles, 2011 UT App 291, 263 P.3d 469 is also inapposite. In that case, defense counsel also failed to 
investigate one potential witness, see id. ~ 34, and was unable to call other witnesses because of defense counsel's 
own negligence in secu'rL'1g the testimony, see id ~ 30. rn reversing th<! defendant's conviction, the court of appeals 
expressly noted that there was no strategic or tactical reason for defense counsel's failure to investigate and secure 
the testimony of key witnesses. See id. ~130-31. To the contrary, defonse counsel intended to call the witnesses but 
failed to take the necessary action to sec1Jre their testimony. See id. Those facts stand in stark contrast to this case, 
where the State has offered several tactical reasons for the actions of Lynch's counsel and the undisputed evidence 
shows that counsel did undertake an investigation and thoroughly revkwed the case with Lynch. 
5 
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(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
and· 
(iv).viewed with all the'.other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to 
the sentence received. 
Id. The evidence in question· must demonstrate that there is more than "a mere possibility that an 
item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense or might have affected the 
outcome of the trial," Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ~ 50, 184 P.3d 1226 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Instead, the newly discqvered evidence, when viewed with the other evidence in the 
record, must "create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." Id.~ 51; cf Brown v. State, 
2013 UT 42, ~ 45, 308 P.3d 486 (holding that a factual innocence claim based on newly 
discovered evidence under the PCRA "allows a court to base its determination of factual 
innocence on all available evidence-both old and new"). 
In this case·, the State first argues that the newly discovered evidence-two affidavits 
from investigators.who examined the truck and overheard Detective Anderson--does not meet 
the PCRA's newlydiscovered evidence standard because the information regarding the condition 
of the truck could liave been discovered.by the investigators and experts that were utilized by 
Lynch's trial counsel. See Utah Cocle Arm.§ 78B-9-104(f)(l). However, the State does not 
make any argument regarding Lynch's ability to obtain the other information contained in the 
affidavits, including the statement that the investigators heard Detective Anderson state that no 
zip ties were found at the scene of the accident where Lynch's wife was killed. Therefore, in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, I cannot say that Lynch could have learned of Detective 
Anderson's alleged statement at an earlier time. 
Furthermor~, viewing Detective Anderson's alleged statement with the other evidence in 
the record and in the light most favorable to Lynch, as I must, see Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ~ 6, that 
evidence is clearly material. Indeed, the presence (or lack thereof) of the zip ties at the scene and 
the related questions of whether the hood of Lynch's truck could latch and the damage to the 
truck were key pieces of evidence that the State relied on to demonstrate that Lynch's truck was 
the truck that actuaJly struck and killed the victim. Moreover, as Lynch notes, there is evidence 
that Detective And~rson delayed booking the zip ties as evidence, which would also support 
Lynch's claim that jhe zip ties were not found at the scene of the accident. Thus, assuming that 
all of the statements in the affidavits:are true, the newly discovered evidence would clearly be 
material and could create a reasonable doubt regarding Lynch's guilt.9 In light of those facts, I 
DENY the State's motion for summary judgment with respect to Lynch's newly discovered 
evidence claim. 
9 The State notes that some of the allegations in the affidavits is controverted by other statements by witnesses at 
trial. However, on summary judgment, a trial court may not weigh evidence, assess credibility, or otherwise resolve 
disputed issues of fact. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d l 170, 1172 (Utah 1983); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 
909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Therefore, it would clearly be inappropriate for me to weigh the new 
evidence or judge the c,redibility of the affiants' statements at this stage of the proceeding. Instead, as explained 
above, I must accept those statements as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to Lynch. See Orvis, 
2008 UT 2, '\16. 
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CONCLUSION 
In sum, the claims Lynch has previously asserted before this Court and the appellate 
court are barred under the PCRA. Lynch's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
also fail on the merits because defense counsel had legitimate tactical reasons for their actions 
and Lynch is unable to establish that counsel's actions were prejudicial. Therefore, I GRANT 
the State's motion for summary judgment with respect to Lynch's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. 
There is nothing before me to suggest that Lynch would have been able to discover 
Detective Anderson's statements regarding the zip ties at an earlier time. When viewed in the 
light most favorable to Lynch, along with the other new and existing evidence, that evidence is 
material. Therefore, I DENY the State's motion for summary judgment with respect to Lynch's 
newly discovered evidence claim. 10 
DATED this tlf dar of January, 2014 
10 In the memorandum supporting the motion for summary judgment, the State also seeks dismissal of Lynch's 
claims that are predicated on a new rule, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-I 04(f) (2013) (allowing a petitioner to seek 
postconviction relief where the appellate courts announce a new rule that would entitle a petitioner to postconviction 
relief) announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32,279 P.3d 396. Lynch does not respond 
to the State's argument that the supreme court did not actually announce a new rule in Gregg, and there is nothing in 
the Gregg decision that appears to be a new rule. Therefore, to the extent that Lynch seeks relief on the newly 
announced rule provision, I agree with the State that Lynch's claim fails as a matter oflaw and I GRANT summary 
judgment on that claim for relief. 
7 
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Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing 5/1/2014 
credibility of Detective Anderson and of their entire case and 
of the booking process and so forth and, for those reasons, I 
request that our motion be granted. 
THE COURT: Thank you. It i.s, I think, clear that the 
standard, here, as to the Court, you must establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the newly-discovered ~ 
~ 
evidence, when viewed with the existing evidence, would lead--no B 
reasonable trier of fact would be able to find Mr. Lynch guilty. 
We are miles and miles away from that. I deny the motion and 
let me indicate why. 
The newly-discovered evidence, in this particular case, 
was sworn testimony that one of the leador, lead investigator 
for the beginning, and a lead witness in the matter, perjured 
himself at trial and, in fact, that the evidence was notthe 
zip-ties were not found at the scene. I believelook at the 
specific quotation. Something to the effect of zip-ties. What 
zip-ties? Those weren't found at the scene. 
Leaving aside Detective Steedor, Officer Steed's inability z 
to specifically tie it to Mr. Anderson, Detective Anderson, 
let's assume that that's the case. Along with the other 
testimony, it would mean that all of the objective evidence, the 
photographs that were taken, were false. 
This is beyondit's beyond dispute ~hat the zip-ties, that 
evidence, was observed in situ, by Detective Anderson and others 
and photographed that day and, then, taken into evidence, into a 
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secure facility and, then, ultimately, to the evidence building. 
: 
The petitioner would have the Court believe that Detective !0 
I: 
Anderson carries with himdon't forget thatthat, while on the 
scene, Detective Anderson, in the presence of others, who knew 
nothing at the time of Mr. Lynch, truck, or anything else, had 
planted the zip-ties and, then, apparently, later, clipped a 
portion of the zip-tie to place in another vehicle. Well, 
forget the fact that that's completely; inconsistent with what 
the alleged newly-discovered evidence is. The newly-discovered 
evidence is that they weren't at the scene. 
This is, kind of, a moving target. It's, now, become that 
the evidence was planted and, thenbut this is theory with 
nothing, whatsoever, to back it up and I can only assume was in 
light of the overwhelming evidence, the objective evidence that, 
in fact, they were discovered at the scene. The petitioner is 
forced to do the best he can with that. 
Petitioner would also have the Court believe that this 
detective, knowing that these individuals were, in fact, 
representatives of Mr. Lynch and had no relationship with them, 
openly admitted to committing a major felony. It defies common 
sense. 
Whether, frankly, there is sufficient evidence that the 
hood was not latching properly, that the hood was opening, the 
witness saw the hood blow open and more than a reasonable basis 
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think Mr. Tenney is right. Who cares? It doesn't matter 
whether or not the hood was tied down. 
I, frankly, found Officer SteedI found everybody quite 
credible. I don't doubt that Officer Steed and the others, 
whatever they thought they heard, they heard. I don't think 
anybody is shading the truth. What actually was said, I don't 
know. It's impossible to believe that Detective Anderson said 
he was the first one on the scene. It's so easily disproven. 
Impossible to believe that they told him the truck was removed 
from the scene. Everybody knows that wasn't the case and, you 
know, it's not just a couple of minor words here that's 
important and, very importantly, right? 
It's why would he tell an individual that those zip-ties 
didn't exist at the time, knowing that there was photographs 
that placed him there, aside from the lack of motive. It, 
simply, defies logic in any way, shape or form and, frankly, I 
found the Detective credible on this point. 
The question about the tow hook or the chain not being 




with it going into a secure facility and, then, ultimately going 0 ~ 
into evidence. I have no indication the chain was actually 
broken and the tow hook kind of thing suffers from the same kind 
of problems. 
The truck is there. The Detective knows, even at the 
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t 
the Court believe that, despite knowing that they could bring it~ 
in, or the Court could go out and see it, that somebody is 
fabricating their testimony about an obviously objective piece 
of evidence. 
Now, you know, is the tow hook meant to describe an 
aLtachment to which a hook could apply or was the word used 
inappropriately? I don't know, but it doesn't come close to 
suggesting perjury or lack of credibility and the fact I found 
the Detective to be eminently credible, but I don't want to 
suggest, by thatI want to be very careful about this, that I 
didn't find the other witnesses, as well. I didn't have any 
sense, frankly, that Mr. Lynch's witnesses were lying. 
' 
I thought Mr. Steed, in particular, was quite credible. 
~ 
2 
Unfortunately, people mishear things and it would beif there was • 
any untruth that was said at the time, it would be that they 
were, in fact, found at the scene, but were pulling Mr. Steed's 
leg, if anything was said. Why somebody would do that, I don't 
know, but it's the overwhelming objective evidence. It's just 
that, overwhelming and objective, of where those zip-ties were 
and viewed in light of the additional evidence as well, 
motive, all of the specific reasons that I remember. 
the 
Frankly, this is a trial that isl remember. I mean, it's 
not lost on me and I've heard various motions, over the years. 
I don't--this is not one in which I believe that, when viewed in 
the context of all Lhe evidencefrankly, I don't buy the 
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newly-discovered evidence at this point. I think it's clear, 
based on what I've said there, it's, you knowI don't know what 
was said, but there was no perjury and there's no indication 













whatsoever, in this record to suggest that these detectives took I 
the evidence to what they thought was a hit and run, that they 
carry it with them so that they can plant it at a scene and use 
it later to plant on some other piece of evidence is, frankly, 
there's not a shred of evidence, in this record, that that's 
what occurred and, frankly, it's irrelevant because that's 
nothing but theory. It has nothing to do with the 
newly-discovered evidence in this particular case. 
For all of those reasons and, frankly, more, this petition 
is denied in its entirety. I don't believe that writings are 
necessary. I believe that the Court's recitation, on the 
record, of its findings is appropriate. Thank you. 
MR. AUSTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you both. The exhibits. 
Make sure that you gather the exhibits and, Mr. Austin, I think 
you did a fine job. 
MR. AUSTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think you did aboth you and Mr. Tenney--
[End of audio recording.] 
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